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Abstract 
The stochastic properties of prices in a speculative market are investigated. Agents in 
the market start with different priors, but update in a rational (i.e., Bayesian) way from 
realizations of payoffs on the risky asset. Convergence of the equilibrium price to the 
rational expectations price is investigated, as well as the asymptotic properties of two 
standard tests of rational expectations. The results are contrasted with stylized facts 
from forward markets. 
Asset Prices in a Speculative Market 
Peter Bossaerts * 
1 Introduction
It is well known that convergence to the truth in a model of Bayesian learning may 
fail for many priors. The set of priors for which beliefs diverge is topologically large 
(Freedman [1963]). Consequently, in a market with agents who update using Bayes' rule, 
the equilibrium price will not converge to the rational expectations price for many priors. 
The examples leading to nonconvergence of beliefs, however, are complicated (Freed­
man and Diaconis [1986]). In contrast, beliefs will converge almost surely (under the true 
probability measure) in standard problems, such as when the volatility of a normally dis­
tributed random variable is unknown and beliefs are drawn from the family of inverted 
gamma distributions. 
In other situations, convergence of beliefs fails either because learning is sub-optimal 
(as in most of the Least Squares learning models; see, e.g., Fourgeaud, Gourieroux and 
Pradel [1986], Marcet and Sargent [1989]), or because learning is active (i.e., in bandit 
problems; see, e.g., Easley and Kiefer [ 1988], Feldman and McLennan [1989], El-Gama! 
and Sundaram [1992]). 
Nevertheless, I provide a very simple example of failure of equilibrium prices to con­
verge to the rational expectations price in a market where agents trade a forward contract 
on an-underly-ing-asset-w-hose-price-is--distTibuted .as .. the square-of a -mean-zero normal 
random variable. Investors do not know the mean of the underlying price, but start with 
differing beliefs drawn from the family of inverted gamma distributions. They update 
rationally, i.e., using Bayes' rule. 
'Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 288-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, 
CA 91125. Phone (818) 356-4028. I am very grateful to Mahmoud El-Gama! for insisting that I think 
differently about asset pricing. Whereas Mahmoud is not to blame for any mistake, he certainly is to be 
credited for the inspiration. 
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The main feature of this model is the difference in beliefs among agents. It is the 
only reason why agents trade, i.e., they have no hedging motive. In other words, the 
equilibrium price of the forward market is purely speculative: it reflects the distribution 
of beliefs in the economy. 
The absence of common beliefs is the cause for the failure of forward prices to converge 
to the rational expectations price. Indeed, if investors had common priors, drawn from 
the same distribution, convergence in probability (under the true probability measure) 
would have ensued. Nonconvergence obtains because investors do not learn uniformly. 
Unfortunately, I also show that, even if the parameters are constrained so that con­
vergence in probability follows, standard statistics will not converge to their rational 
expectations equivalent. Both the average prediction error and the average prediction 
error multiplied by the forward rate, scaled by the square root of the sample size, con­
verge weakly to a random variable that (i) has higher variance than if the economy had 
been at its rational expectations equilibrium from the outset, and that (ii) is non-normal. 
The differences in beliefs is not crucial here: with homogeneous beliefs, a similar result 
follows. Consequently, convergence to rational expectations does not justify the use of 
properties of statistics that were derived under rational expectations. 
The aforementioned statistics diverge, moreover, when there is a possibility that the 
economy does not converge to rational expectations. I show that both statistics diverge 
at a rate that is proportional to the square root of the sample size. Suitably scaled, 
the first statistic (the average prediction error) converges to a mean-zero random vari­
able, whereas the second statistic (the average prediction error times the forward rate) 
converges to a mean-positive random variable. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes my 
economy of speculating agents. Section 3 deals with the first question: will rational 
expectations be attained? Section 4 investigates the asymptotics of two popular statistics 
(testing unbiasedness and predictability, respectively) when prices do converge to their 
rational expectations equivalent. Section 5 does the same when convergence fails. The 
last section discusses the relevance of the theoretical findings of this paper for the behavior 
of forward interest and foreign exchange rates. It suggests that speculation-based theories 
may be useful complements to standard theories of risk premia. 
2 Description of the Economy
Consider a repetition of one-period economies with a speculative market. The only 
link between economies at adjacent dates are the beliefs: agents living in the previous 
period only pass tl1eir updated beliefs 011 to tl1e i1ex:t ge11eratio11. Eacl1 date, indexed t 
= 1, 2, 3, ... , a forward market is held. The payoff on the forward contract depends on 
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the subsequent period's value of a random variable, Xt+l· The forward rate, denoted p,,
clears the market. If an agent takes a long position of one forward contract, the payoff 
on her position will be Xt+i - p,. If she shorts one unit, her payoff will be Pt - xt+l· 
x, (t = 1, 2, 3, . . . ) is a real random variable with a distribution that depends on
the value of a parameter (), ()*. Agents do not know ()*.  The first generation (those
that live at date 0), however, have beliefs about e, speculate in the forward market,
observe the payoffs, update their beliefs in a Bayesian way, and pass them on to the next 
generation. There are a countably infinite number of agents, indexed by j = 1, 2, 3, .. .. 
All behave competitively (they take prices as given). At date t, only the agents indexed 
j = 1, .. ., t participate in the forward market. The subsequent trading round, the agent
with j = t + 1 enters, after updating her beliefs using all observations from the outset on 
(x1, X2, .•• , Xt+1). 
()takes values in a parameter space 8 (a subset of R), with corresponding Borel '7-
algebra F(8). Agent j's initial beliefs about B can be summarized by a measure Aja on
(8,F(8)). Aja E I1(8), the set of probability measures on 8. The x,s, t = 1, 2, 3, ... ,
are i.i.d. random variables that live in an outcome space X, with corresponding Borel 
'7-algebra F( X). All agents agree on the probability measure over X that generates x,, 
given a parameter value e. Let Pe,1 denote this probability measure. We shall work
with the product space e x x x x .. . x x ( t replicae of x generate this product), with
corresponding product '7-algebra F(8 x X x X ... XX), and probability measures Qj,, 
where 
Qj,(d(e, x1, x2, ... x,)) Aja(dO)Pe,t(d(x1, x2, ... x,)) 
Aja( d())Pe,1 ( dx1 )Pe,1 ( dx2) ... Pe.i ( dx,). 
We are interested, in particular, in j's conditional beliefs about e, given a t-period
history, x1, x2, • • • , x,, namely, Qjt(Alxi, x2, ... , x1), for any A E F(8). This conditional
belief is formed using the rules of conditional probability (Bayes' rule), and passed on to 
member j of the next generation. For clarity, let Ajt(A) denote this conditional belief.
Let J( xde) be the density of P0,1 with respect to the Lebesgue measure. As mentioned
before, beliefs are updated using Bayes' rule. This means: 
.Ajt(A) 
for any A E F(8). 
IA J(xt1e)Ajt-1(de) 
fe f(x,IB)Ajt-1(d())
B(x,, Ajt-il(A), 
Assume that preferences and endowments each date are such that the demand for 
forward contracts can be described by a function that depends only on an agent's beliefs 
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and the forward quote. (Agents observe the equilibrium forward quote when determining 
their demand.) Let D denote this demand function. 
D: II(El) x R _, R: (,\,p) _, D(>..,p). (1) 
Each period, the forward market will clear at a rate that sets the average demand equal 
to zero. Assuming competitive behavior, this means: 
1 t- L D(>..1i,Pt) = 0.t j=I (2) 
To summarize, each period t, agent j (j = 1, .. ., t) speculates in a forward market, 
depending on her beliefs Ajt and the equilibrium quote Pt· After the forward market closes, 
Xt+I is revealed and forward contracts are settled (if j demanded D(>..1i,Pt) contracts, she 
will receive D(>..jt,Pt)(xt+1 - Pt) units of consumption). From x,+I, beliefs are updated 
to Ajt+I, using Bayes' rule, and the result is passed on to the individual in the next 
generation corresponding to j. Agent t + 1 then enters the forward market for the first 
time, with beliefs At+I,t+I, updated from the initial observation on. 
The rational expectations forward rate is defined to be the rate that clears the market 
assuming agents know IJ*, i.e., their beliefs put unit mass on the true IJ. Let De• denote
such beliefs. Hence, the rational expectations forward quote, denoted pre, solves: 
� tD(8e.,pre) = 0.
f j=I 
(3) 
Of course, because we have made the assumption that demand depends only on beliefs 
and the forward rate, volume in the forward market will be zero when the economy is at 
its rational expectations equilibrium (not an uncommon feature of rational expectations 
models). 
Consider now the following parametrization. Let Xt be the square of a normally 
distributed random variable, with mean zero and variance IJ2• Let the priors on IJ be 
inverted gamrna-2 distribution with parameters Vj and v1 ( v1 > O; Vj E {3, 4, 5, . .. } ). Let
D(>.1i,Pt) = Ajt[f,y xf(xl!J)dx] - Pt· Functional notation will be used throughout; this 
conveniently indicates the measures over which expectations are taken; e.g., Ajt[g(IJ)] = 
fe g(1J)>..1t(d!J). The following utility function justifies the demand function: 
>.1t[ { (D(x - Pt) - �D2)f(xl!J)dx],lx 2 
This is a utility function characterized by risk neutrality and quadratic adjustment costs. 
Under the above assumptions, 
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where Vj and Vj parametrize agent j's initial beliefs about 0, and 
l 
v· t Ajt[ xf(xlO)dx] = 2 Vj + Wt,
X Vj + t -2 l/j + t -2 
where Wt = i L�=l X7• Fix beliefs as follows. Agent j has Vj = j + 2. Vj is set to a
common value, v. Consequently, 
and 
j+2 t D(,\j,, Pt) = -. -v + -. - w, - p,,
J+t J+t 
1 t j+2 t Pt = t _L( �v + �w,), ;=1 J J 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
We shall consider two cases. In the first one, the value of v is fixed at ()*2. In the 
second, v is drawn from a distribution over (0, oo ), with expected value equal to ()*2 
and finite variance. Let µ denote the probability measure generated by this distribution. 
Define: 
Me,1(d(v, x1, x2, . . . x,) )  = µ(dv)Pe,1(d(x1, x2, ... x,)). (7) 
3 Convergence to the rational expectations equilib-
• r1um 
Let us first investigate whether equilibrium prices converge to their rational expectations 
equivalent. In order to do so, we establish the following result. 
Theorem 1 
in Me*,oo· 
(All proofs are in the Appendix.) Notice that in this Theorem, convergence is analyzed 
under Me· ,00, i.e., v is considered to be random. 
Several comments can be made about Theorem 1. First, since p'e = ()*2 (Equa­
tion (6)), the theorem effectively is an example of failure of convergence of prices to the 
rational expectations price. N onconvergence does not follow from learning per se, but 
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from the differences in beliefs. As a matter of fact, if agents start with homogeneous 
beliefs (i.e., all agents draw the same v and v), then convergence will follow. What 
keeps prices from convergeing to the rational expectations price is that in my economy, 
while agents are all expected to eventually learn the truth, their beliefs do not converge 
uniformly. I conjecture that uniform convergence of beliefs is a necessary conditions for 
convergence of equilibrium prices to their rational expectations equivalent. 
Second, the result is not an artefact of certain agents entering the market after some 
time. These agents enter the market after updating their beliefs with observations from 
the first trading round on (in financial markets, public disclosure of prices means that new 
participants can start at an equal footing with experienced agents). The entry behavior 
is postulated merely to keep the mathematics simple. 
Third, the nonconvergence result embedded in Theorem 1 is not based on a com­
plicated argument, as are the examples in Diaconis and Freedman [1986]. As already 
mentioned, each individual is expected to learn the truth. Non convergence merely fol­
lows from differences in learning speed. 
Fourth, nonconvergence does not follow from irrational behavior. All agents are 
rational: they do know the laws of probability and use them to update their beliefs. This 
is in contrast to the Least Squares learning literature, where agents do not follow optimal 
updating rules (although the latter might be too hard to derive, and, hence, agents could 
be excused for updating suboptimally). 
In Theorem 1, the value of v that is drawn before the market starts is not necessarily 
equal to (}*2• If we fix v, however, at ()*2, then Pt - (}*2 -> 0 in Pe.,00, and, because 
pre = (}*2 (Equation (6)), equilibrium prices do converge in probability to the rational 
expectations price. We write this result as a corollary. 
Corollary 1.1 Let v = (}*2• Then: 
in Po*,oo · 
4 ·P-r0pert-ies .. 0f·statistics -w·hen convergence to ra­
tional expectations holds 
Let us now investigate the asymptotic properties of two popular tests of rational ex­
pectations (market efficiency). The first test examines whether the average prediction 
error (Pt - Xt+1) equals zero. I shall refer to it as the unbiasedness test. The second
test explores whether the prediction error is correlated with the past forward rate, i.e., 
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whether the average prediction error multiplied by the forward rate ((Pt - Xt+i)Pt) equals
zero. I shall refer to this one as the predictability test. The unbiasedness test involves 
the average prediction error, namely, 
(8) 
The predictability test uses the average prediction error multiplied by the forward rate, 
I.e., 
(9) 
To test unbiasedness and predictability, the quantities in (8) and (9) are scaled. The 
scaling factor is chosen such that, if prices indeed were formed by rational expectations 
from time 1 on, the corresponding statistics would converge to a standard normal random 
variable. 
What if beliefs do not correspond to rational expectations from the initial trading 
round on? What if, in addition, beliefs initially differ, so that, at least during early 
rounds, prices are the consequence of speculating agents, as in my model? In this section, 
we shall investigate these questions for the case when equilibrium prices eventually do 
converge to the rational expectations price. In my model, this is obtained by fixing v to 
be equal to (}*2 (Corollary 1.1). The next section will deal with the asymptotics of both 
statistics when prices do not necessarily converge, i.e., vis drawn from some (nontrivial) 
measureµ. 
Let us investigate the two parts of the test statistics, namely, the averages in (8) 
and (9), and the scaling factors, separately. Consider first the averages. Theorem 2 
determines the asymptotics in the general case, i.e., when v does not necessarily equal 
(}*2• Consequently, we will be able to refer to this Theorem in the next section as well. 
Theorem 2 
both in Mo· 00• 
Setting v = (}*2, one obtains: 
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Corollary 2.1 Let v = 0*2• Then:
1 T 
T L(Pt -Xt+1) --+ 0,t=l 
1 T 
T L(Pt - Xt+i)Pt --+ 0, t:;:;:l 
both in Po',oo. 
Corollary 2.1 clearly indicates that the temporary speculative nature of equilibrium prices 
affects neither the average prediction error nor the average prediction error multiplied by 
the forward rate. This is good news: when the economy is known to converge to rational 
expectations, certain quantities have the same asymptotic behavior as if the economy 
were at its rational expectations equilibrium from the initial day on. 
Unfortunately, the positive result in Corollary 2.1 does not carry over to the corre­
sponding test statistics, which are obtained by scaling. Let us first explore what happens 
when we scale the averages in (8) and (9) by multiplying with the square root of the 
sample size, VT. 
Theorem 3 Let v = 0*2• Then:
1 T (1 1 VT(T �(Pt - Xt+1)p,)--+ v'20*4(1n 2  Jo ;)W('l)d1) - W(l)),
both weakly. W('l) is the value of a standard Brownian motion at 1) ('7 E [O, l]). 
Next, divide by the square root of the sample variances of (8) and (9). Define: 
and 
T 1 � 2 V1r = T L.Jp, -Xt+1) 
t=l 
(10) 
(11) 
(Equation (11) is an estimator of the variance of (9) assuming homoscedasticity.) Both 
n"an+;t;""" rr.n-.ra-..ga � ...... -nr�hah;l;+u as ofaf=..-1 ;.,.... f ha -n<:iov·+ 'f'hc.,....-r>c.m '1'-'" J.J.IJJ.VJ.'vo.;J VVJ..lV'v..l 'v .LU. P VIJ IJJ. .11-'Jl LIV OVU. J..l.l tJL1-V .l.LV.Al! _L.l.L< ... A.IJ.VJ..l . 
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Theorem 4 Let v = B*2• Then:
both in Pe.,oo . 
Vi T --+ 28*4,
V2r --+ 2B*s'
Combining Theorems 3 and 4, we obtain the·asymptotics ofthe unbiasedness and pre­
dictability tests in an economy of speculating investors which is known to converge to 
rational expectations. 
Corollary 4.1 Let v = B*2. Then:
1 T 1 1 VT( v1\T,T 2=(Pt -xt+1))--+ ln 2 [ -W(77)d77 - W(l),T Vir t=I lo 77 
1 T fol 1VT( v1\T,T 2=(Pt -xt+1)Pt)--+ ln 2 -W(77)d77 - W(l), T ViTt=I 0 77 
both weakly. W(77) is the value of a standard Brownian motion at 77 (77E[O, 1]). 
Comparing the asymptotics of Corollary 4.1 with the corresponding result when the 
economy is at its rational expectations equilibrium from the beginning on (both statistics 
then converge to W(l)), we see that the difference equals ln 2f� �W(77)d77 in both cases. 
This random variable is a functional of a standard Brownian motion over the interval 
[O, l ]. 
Corollary 4. 1 clearly implies that asymptotic analysis of test statistics must consider 
explicitly the transient learning. The derivation of properties of test statistics as if the 
economy were at its rational expectations equilibrium from the intial trading round on 
cannot be justified by the knowledge that the economy will move eventually toward 
rational expectations. 
I should emphasize that this negative result does not depend on differences in beliefs
per se. A careful analysis of the proofs confirms that if investors all start with the same 
beliefs, a-similar-rnsult.would.follow . •  In.other"words, standa1;d asy:mptotics fail to hold in 
the mere presence of learning. This contrasts with the findings in the previous section: 
convergence to rational expectations (at least in my economy) would always obtain under 
homogeneous beliefs. 
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5 Properties of statistics when convergence to ra­
tional expectations does not follow 
In the general case (vis drawn according to a measureµ), the averages in (8) and (9) 
do not converge to zero, and, hence, the corresponding statistics diverge. It is possible, 
however, to establish the speed of divergence. 
Theorem 5 
both in Me· oo. 
Theorem 5 not only provides an estimate of the speed of convergence (of the order 
of the square root of the sample size), but indicates what variables the statistics con­
verge to (in probability) when suitably scaled. The first statistic, corresponding to the 
unbiasedness test, when multiplied by 1/VT, converges to a random variable that de­
pends on v -()*2• v -()*2 varies across economies and can be both positive and negative. 
Consequently, we expect to see both positive and negative values for the unbiasedness 
statistic in cross-section, and they should increase (or decrease) in proportion with the 
square root of the sample size. The second statistic, used in the predictability test, con­
verges to a variable that is more likely to be positive (because of the quadratic term 
(ln(�))2(v -0*2)2). Consequently, we expect to see a higher proportion of positive values 
for this statistic in cross-section. They as well should be increasing with the square root 
of the sample size. 
6 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of this paper seems to be particularly relevant in view of some longstanding 
puzzles about asset prices, in particular, forward rates. Errors from forward rates as 
predictors of future spot rates have persistently been found to be biased and predictable. 
Tl1is is inost obvious in tl1e case of ii1terest rates (see, e.g., Faina [1986]). On tl1e aver­
age, one-month forward rates implicit in two-month U.S. Treasury bill prices have been 
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above next month's one-month spot rate, and the prediction error, multiplied by the 
forward rate, is positive on average. As a matter of fact, explaining this finding is what 
term structure theory is about. While various equilibrium rational-expectations models 
attribute it to the presence of a (time-varying) risk premium (e.g., Cox, Ingersoll and 
Ross [1985]), the empirical succes of such models has been mixed at best. Some even 
wonder whether they will ever fit the data (e.g., Den Haan [ 1991]). In contrast, this 
.paper indicates that speculation may explain the empirical regularities. 
Among other things, speculation not only explains why the one-month forward rates 
are biased and the prediction error multiplied by the forward rate is positive on average, 
but why the same phenomenon is true for two-month, three-month, four-month and five­
month forward rates as well (then-month forward rate predicts the one-month spot rate 
n months in the future, or then - 1-month forward rate one month ahead). Speculation 
also explains why the corresponding statistics (scaled averages) often increase with the 
square root of the sample size. 
F igure 1 illustrates this. It plots, as a function of sample size, (i) the unbiasedness 
statistic, (ii) the predictability statistic, (iii) the averages in (8) and (9), for the three­
month forward interest rate (the results are similar for other forward rates1). A square 
root function is also fitted to (i) and (ii), in order to calibrate trends. All time series are 
constructed using the Fama Treasury bill files on the CRSP tapes. The sample consists 
of monthly values over the period 1959-86. I took the n-month forward rate in excess of
then -1-month forward rate as a predictor of the change in then - 1-month forward 
rate, in order to avoid well-known nonstationarity problems (the 0-month forward rate is 
the spot rate). In the notation of the model in the previous sections, Pt is the n-month 
forward rate in excess of the n -1-month forward rate, and xt+1 is the change in the
n -1-month forward rate. 
Prediction errors in forward foreign exchange rates exhibit the same behavior (see, 
e.g., Fama [ 1984]). Their averages are positive or negative, but, when multiplied by the
forward rate, their averages are always positive. The corresponding statistics often grow 
proportional to the square root of the sample size. Figure 2 illustrates this. It plots the 
same variables as Figure 1 for one-month forward Japanese yen rates (the figures are 
similar for the deutsche mark, British pound, Swiss Frank, Canadian Dollar and French 
franc). Again, the forward rate in excess of the spot rate is taken as a predictor of the 
change in the spot rate, in order to avoid problems with nonstationarity. The data are 
sampled in intervals of four weeks over the period 1973-90. The data were acquired from 
DRI. 
As with forward interest rates, the behavior of forward foreign exchange rates has been 
linked to equilibrium models within the rational expectations framework, but attempts to 
fit such models to the data have hitherto met little succes (for an overview, see Hodrick 
1The complete set of figures can be obtained from the author. 
11 
[1987]). While they should not be ignored, data-related problems do not explain the 
findings either (Bossaerts and Hillian [1991]). Speculation, however, provides a viable 
alternative (or complement), well worth further investigation. 
An asset pricing theory based on speculation has the added advantage that it read­
ily explains trading volume, something which is difficult within a rational expectations 
framework (see Harris and Raviv [1991]). It also provides an alternative justification for 
trade in options (Bossaerts and Hillian [1992]). In a model of rational expectations and 
frictionless markets, trading in derivative securities such as options can only be linked to 
market completion. 
A closer look at F igures 1 and 2 indicates that part of the puzzle is left unexplained. 
In particular, while the statistics of the predictability test increase in proportion to the 
square root of the sample size, this is not the case for the unbiasedness test. The square 
root function fits miserably. The unscaled averages, however, still reveal evidence of 
slowly changing beliefs: they change substantially as the sample size increases, i.e., they 
do not quickly converge to some population average and stay there forever. 
In my economy, when prices do not converge to their rational expectations equiva­
lent, the statistics corresponding to the unbiasedness and predictability tests increase in 
absolute value, proportional to the square root of the sample size. The former, however, 
will equally likely be positive or negative. The latter will be more often positive. Data 
from the forward interest rate market and the forward foreign exchange market confirm 
this. At present, however, I am unable to grasp the intuition behind this result. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
From Chebychev's inequality: 
From (5)
Hence,
Now: 
and 
< 
{IPt - 8*2 -ln(�)(v - 8*2) I> e}
Me•,oolPt - 8*2 -ln(})(v -11*2)1 
1 t j+2 t Pt= - 2.)-. v +-.-w1). t j=I J + t J + t
Me•,oolPt - 11*2 - ln(�)(v - 8*2)1
I •21 1 � j + 2 ( e )< µv- B  -L._,-. -ln -t j=l J + t 2 
+ Pe',oolWt - 11*211� t-. t_ It j=I J + t 
+ IJ*2I� t--,2-1 t j=I J + t 
. l 'j+2 lzmt�=- I:-. -t j=I J + t
1 t t lim1. - 2:::---= t j=I J + t 
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1 t t < lim, - "' -�= t L., t ;=1 
t2 = lim,�00 tZ 
= 1
Also 
and 
1 t 2 -2=-. - ---t O 
t ]=1 J + t 
as t ---t oo. Consequently: 
D 
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Proof of Corollary 1.1 
From (6), the rational expectations price equals: p'e = 8*2.
The result then follows immediately from Theorem 1. 
D 
Proof of Theorem 2 
First, consider 1' L;f=1(p, - X1+1)-ln (%) (v -8*2):
� t(p, -xt+1) -In (�) (v - 0*2)T t-1 2 
� t, ((p, -0'2) -ln(�)(v - 0*2)) -� t,(x1+1 - 0*2)
- (v -0*2)-I; -I:-. - -In(-) 
1 T ( l 'j+ 2 e) 
T t=l t 1=1 J + t 2 
+ -I;(w, -0*2) - I:-. - + 0*2-I:- I:-. -1 
T ( 1 t t ) 1 T 1 t 2 
T t=1 t 1+t J + t T t=l t 1=1 J + t
- � t(x1+1 - 0*2).T t=1 
Using Chebychev's inequality: 
Me•,oo {1� t,(Pt -x1+1)-In (�) (v - 0*2)1 > E} 
< Me',ool1' L(Pt -X1+1) - ln(�)(v -8*2)1 - . E 
The numerator of the right-hand side can be rewritten as: 
Me-,ool� L(Pt - X1+1) -ln(�)(v -8*2)1
< µIv -8*21� t � t j + 2 -In (�)
T t=l t j=I J + t � 
l T  1 1 t l Tl t 2 
+ -I: Pe-,oolWt - 8*21 -I:-. - + 8*2- I:- I:-. -T t=1 t 1=1 J + t T t=l t i=l J + t
I 1 T 
I + Pe•,oo I_'.:_ I: Xt+l -8*2 .T t=l 
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The last term converges to zero as T--> oo .  The terms in the sum (overt) in the first term 
converge to zero, hence, they are Cesaro summable, and their average converges to zero as 
well. The average (over j) in the second term is finite, for all t. Since Po.,00[w,-ll*2[--> 0, 
the terms in this sum (over t) are Cesaro summable, and the expression converges to 
zero as well. The third term is also a Cesaro sum with limit 0. 
Again appealing to Chebychev's inequality, convergence to zero of the following must be 
verified: 
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+ Me',oo I� t,(xt+l -0*2)(p, - 0*2) I 
+ 8*2 Me•,ool � IJxt+l - 8*2)1. t=l 
Convergence of the last term is easily-established,-Convergence of.the·Becond term follows 
from the first part of this proof. Consider the third term: 
Me•,oo I� t,(xt+l -0*2)(Pt -0*2) 1 
1 � •2 2 1�j+2 < Me•,oo - L. Jx,+1-0 )(v-0* )(- �-.- ) T t=l t ]=1 J + t 
+ Me•,oo � IJx,+1 - 0*2)(w, -0*2)(� t �) 
t=l j=I J + 
+li*22_ tPe•,oolxt+1 -8*211� t-.-2 1. T t=l t ]=I J + t 
Convergence to zero of the last term follows from Cesaro summability. As to the second 
term, write: 
Me•,oo 2_ t(xt+1 -0*2)(w, -0*2)(� t-. t_ ) T t=I t j=l J + t 
1 � 2 •21 
1 � t < T � Pe•,oo I Xt+l -O* I Po•,ool Wt -0 I-;;� -. - t 1,t=l j=I J + 
and convergence to zero follows again from Cesaro summability. Next, the first term can 
be rewritten as follows: 
17 
t 
Define: s, = 2:(x7 - B*2) and Wr(1J) = Jr018,,s["T)· Then:T=l 
l T l ' j +2 
Pe',oo - L(Xt+l - B*2)(- I:-.-) T t=1 t i=I J + t 
p,. ..1:. � v'Tvf2e•2 (-1 ___ 1 _3 __ 1_ 1 s ) (� � j + 2) e ,oo T � VT v12e·2 '+1 VT ./2 e·2 ' t � j + t 
•2 
I f,
T+l/T VT [hT)/T [1)T ]  + 3 
I < 
vf2 0 Pe',oo 1/T [1)T ]  Jo [�TJ + [1)T ]  + 1d�dWr(1J) .
As T --+ =, 
but 
VT 
[7JT ]  -t 0.
Consequently, this term converges to zero as well. 
Finally, to show convergence to zero of the first term, write: 
18 
+ 2µlv - ()*21_!:_ t Po•,oo lw, - ()*21 (� t j. + 2) (� t-. t_) T t=l t j=l J + t t j=l J + t 
+ 2 0*2µlv - ()*21_!:_ f, (� t j + 2 ) (� t-. 2_) T t=l t j=l J + t t j=l J + t 
().2 1 ..f-- I •2 I ( 1 � t ) ( 1 � 2 )+2 · -L.JP0•,00·w,- B -L.J-. - L.J -. - . T t=l t j=l J + t t j=O J + t 
Cesaro summability implies that the 3rd, 5th and 6th terms converge to zero. The 
arguments of the first part of this proof immediately lead to convergence to zero of the 
1st, 2nd and 4th terms. 
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Proof of Corollary 2.1 
Immediate from Theorem 2. 
D 
Proof of Theorem 3 
Borrowing results from the proof of Theorem 2, write: 
Define s, and Wr( 1)) as in the proof of Theorem 2. Then:
Using a version of the continuous mapping theorem that allows the functional to depend 
on the sample size (Billingsley [1968], Theorem 5.5, p. 34), and noting that, as T -->  oo,
one obtains: 
( 1 T 1 t t \ rI 1 VT 1 -l:(w, -li*2)(- I:-.-))"-' J2B'2ln2 I -W(17)d17,\ T t=I t j=I J + t Jo 1) 
20 
where W(ry) is the value of a standard Brownian motion at 77(c[O, l]). 
Next consider: 
VTfJ*2 (2-t � t �) T t=1 t i=t J + t 
as T ---> oo .  Finally, 
f' T f(["TJ+i)/T 2VT 0*2 lo [77T J  + 1 lo [eTJ + ['IT ]+ 2 ded77
-t 0 
r.; •2 ( 1 1 ) 1 v ,,e 1m�sr + 1m(xr+1 - x,) vT v20*2 vT 
"""v2e·2w(1), 
by Donsker's Theorem (Billingsley [1965], Theorem 16.1, p. 137). 
As for the second part of the theorem, consider: 
VT ( � t(Pt - Xt+1)Pt) 
\ t=l 
- VT (2-t(Pt - (J* 2)2) + VT0*2 (2-t(Pt - 0*2)) T t=t T t=1 
-VT(� t,(x,+1 - 0*2)(p, -0*2)) - VT(J*2 (� t,(x,+1 -11*2)) .
The fourth term is easiest: 
21 
by Donsker's Theorem. The second term was shown in the first part of this proof to 
converge to: 
VTrr2 (r1 f,(p, - 0*2) ) "'"' v'20*4ln 2 f1 �W(77)d77.t=l lo 77 
Using arguments from the proof ofTheorem 2, 
VT (� �(x,+i -rr2)(p, - 0*2 ))
VT (rl f,(x,+1 - 0*2)(w, - 0*2)(� t-. t-) ) 
t=l t j=l J + t 
+ VT0*2 (r1 IJx1+1 - 0*2)( � t-. 2- )) .
1=1 t j=l J + t 
Using Chebychev's inequality, the last term converges to zero in probability. To see this, 
consider: 
The first part of this proof showed that VT(t I:f=1(� 2:}=11!1)) __, 0 as T--+ =·
Using arguments from the proof of Theorem 2, 
22 
As T ---> oo,
but 
T3/2 
[17TJ2 _, O.
Consequently, the above expression converges to zero. 
Finally, 
VT (2-IJPt - 17*2)2 )T t=t 
- VT (2_ t ((w, - e*2)( � t-. t_) + ir2( � t-. 2-l) 
2
)
T t=t t i=t J + t t i=t J + t 
VT (2- t(w, - e·2)2( � t-. t_ l2 ) T t=t t i=t J + t 
+ VTIJ*4 (2-t( � t-. 2_)2 ) T t=t t i=t J + t 
+2VTIJ*2 (2_ t(w, -1!*2)( � t-. t-)(� t � ) ) .T t=t t i=t J + t t i=t J + t 
The first term converges to zero: 
and, as T ---> oo 
23
but 
T3/ 2 
[17T ] 2 ---+ 
O.
The second term converges to zero as well: 
VTB*4 (2-IJ � t-. 2-)2) T t=1 t j=1 J + t 
- ()*4 d d 1
1 ( T 1([ryT]+1)/T 2 Tl/4 ) 2 
0 [17T ]  + 1 0 [eT J + [17T ]  + 2 
e 1),
and, as T ---t oo, 
Finally, 
T 
lo
([ryT]+l)/T 2 Tl/4---- de ---to. [17T ]  + 1 o [eT J + [17T ] 
2VTB*2 (2_ f,(w, - B*2)( � t-. t-)( � t-,2_ )) T t=l t j=l J + t t j=l J + t 
2VTB*2 (2-�VT v'2B*2(_l ___ l_s) 
T � t VT .j2()•2 t 
I't 1'2 )(tf; j+t)(tf;j+t) 
rT+I/T r3 ( r["T/T] [17ri ) ( r["T]/T 2 )2vf2o•• 11/T [17T ]3 lo [eT J  + [17T ]  + 1 de lo [eT J + 17T ]  + 1 d e  
WT( 1) )d( 1) ) .
Since JJ"T]/T [<Tl+l"T]+l de ---+ 0 as T ---+ oo, the above expression converges to zero.
D 
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Proof of Theorem 4 
To prove the first claim, verify whether 
Pe•,ool�t(Pt -Xt+i)2 -211'41T t=I 
converges to zero. Convergence in Pe.,00 then follows from Chebychev's inequality. Re­
arrange this expression: 
Pe•,ool� t(Pt -Xt+r)2 - 211'41
t=l 
1 T 1 T < Pe-,ool-L(Pt - 8*2)21+Pe•,ool-2.:(8*2 - Xt+1)2T t=I T t=l 
T 
- 211*41+2Pe•,ool� L(Pt - 8*)(1J*2 -Xt+r) I .
t=l 
Borrowing a result from the proof of Theorem 2, the first term converges to zero. Conver­
gence to zero of the second term follows immediately from the maintained distributional 
assumptions. As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, the third term converges to zero by 
Cesaro summability. 
Consider the second claim. Convergence 111 Pe.,00 will follow, agam by Chebychev's 
inequality, if it is shown that: 
and 
1
1 � 2 8*41 T Pe• ,oo T L.. Pt - ---+ 0 as ---+ oo. t=l 
The former-was·slrown-·before: ·For·the fatter, write: 
1
1 � 2 0*41 Pe•,oo T L..Pt - · t=l 
25  
From the proof of Theorem 2, both terms converge to zero. 
0 
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Proof of Corollary 4.1 
Follows immediately from dividing the results in Theorem 3 by the those of Theorem 2. 
D 
Proof of Theorem 5 
Borrowing results from Theorem 2: 
.Jr (VT(� t,(Pt -Xt+ill) 
1 T 
T 
L(Pt -X1+1)
t=l 
-----+ In(�)( v - B*2)2 
in Mo-,00• The denominator of the first statistic can be rewritten as follows: 
1 T 
T 
L(Pt -X1+1)2t=l 
1 �( B*2)2 1 �(B*2 )2- L., Pt - + - L., - Xt+l T 1�1 T t�1 
+ � IJPt - 0*2)(0*2 - X1+1).t=1 
The proof of Theorem 2 indicates that the first term converges to (In(�) )2 ( v - 0*2)2 in
Mo· ,00, while the third term converges to zero. Because of the distributional assumptions, 
the second term converges to 20*'. Combining the numerator and denominator produces 
the first claim of Theorem 5. 
Analogously, 
Jr (VT(� t,(Pt - Xt+i)Pt)) 
1 T 
T L(Pt - Xt+i)Ptt=l 
---; (ln(�)) 2(v -0*2)2 -0*21n(�)(v -0*2)2 2 
27 
in Mo•,oo· Decompose the denominator into� L;z=1(p1 -X1+1)2 and � LZ=l PZ· By the
above argument, 
in Mo•,oo· Use Chebychev's inequality to show that � LZ=l p; converges in Mo-,00 to
(ln(�))2(v -11*2)2 + fJ*2(fJ*2 + 2 lnH)(v -fJ'2)): 
Mo•,oo !T
l tpz -(ln(_:))2(v -()*2)2 -fJ*2(fJ*2 + 2 ln(_:)(v -()*2))1t=l 2 2 
< Mo•,ool..!:_ t(Pt -fJ*2)2 -(ln(_l'.))2(v -fJ*2)2IT t=1 2 
+ 2fJ*2Mo•,ool..!:_ t(Pt -fJ*2)- ln(_l'.)(v -fJ*2)I.T t=1 2 
From the proof of Theorem 2, both terms converge to zero. 
D 
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